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Rethinking the Millennium Development Goals for Africa 
 
Stephen Peterson* 
November 24, 2010 
 
Abstract 
The global economy and especially its poorest members, face a perfect storm. The crisis 
has been created by a Global LIE: leverage this is unfathomable, institutions that are 
discredited, and, experts who are uncertain about the uncertainty. The poorest countries 
have been the hardest hit by the crisis, and their recovery may be years away. Under 
these circumstances, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are not a best bet 
development strategy for Africa. As a financing decision, developed countries have 
never adequately resourced the MDGs and are unlikely to do so in future as they face 
more pressing priorities: entitlements, terror, climate, stimulus, and unwinding. As an 
investment decision, the MDGs focus on social services not infrastructure, which creates 
fiscal stress on the budget. The failure of the MDG to address revenue mobilization 
means that this strategy is fiscally unsustainable. A better strategy for foreign aid are 
DIGs (Decade Infrastructure Goals) that focus on the investment in growth promoting 
infrastructure (revenue, roads, power, and agriculture) rather than social services.  
 
Keywords: economic development, millennium development goals, public financial  
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Takeaways 
Budgets and the African Child 
 
•  The global economic crisis has changed the agenda of global development for 
developed and developing countries alike 
 
•  At the heart of this crisis is the failure of financial management both public and 
private, to manage risk 
 
•  The MDG’s which focus on social sector service provision add significant fiscal 
stress and thus risk 
 
•  Sustainable development requires sustainable fiscal policy 
 
•  The development dilemma for Africa is the cruel choice between a stagnant 
present or a better future—investment priority of social services or infrastructure 
 
•  Social services are long term liabilities (principally salaries) and should not  
be funded by domestic revenue not volatile foreign aid 
 
•  A ‘better bet’ for using foreign aid in Africa is to have it focus on the Decadal 
Infrastructure Goals (DIGs) (revenue, roads, power) which have proven growth 
multipliers that can ion turn expand domestic revenue for social services 
 
•  If African societies want social services, then they must rely on their own 
pockets, not those of foreigners—taxes are the price of living in a civilized society 
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Acronyms 
MDGs   The Millennium Development Goals 
MEGs   The Millennium Entitlement Goals 
MCGs   The Millennium Climate Goals 
MSGs   The Millennium Stimulus Goals 
MTGs   The Millennium Terrorist Goals 
MUGs   The Millennium Unwinding Goals 
DIGs    The Decade Infrastructure Goals 
DTGs    The Decade Tax Goals 
DRGs   The Decade Road Goals 
DPGs    The Decade Power Goals 
DAGs   The Decade Agriculture Goals 
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I.  Africa Alone 
 
When Hobbes referred to the dire state of human beings having ‘nasty, 
brutish and short’ lives, he also pointed, in the same sentence, to the  
disturbing adversity of being ‘solitary’. Escape from isolation may not 
only be important for the quality of human life, it can also contribute 
powerfully to understanding and responding to the other deprivations  
from which human beings suffer. There is surely a basic strength here  
which is complementary to the engagement in which theories of justice 
are involved.      Amartya Sen
1 
 
50% of African children perish in the first 24 hours of life. The child  
mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is 30 times that of industrialized 
countries. Maternal mortality ratios per 100,000 are over 1000 in Africa,  
500 in South Asia, 130 in Latin America, and 8 in industrialized 
countries.
2 
 
Risk is the gravity of public financial management. It is always there, difficult to 
measure, but ignored at one’s peril. Risk is the core of financial management for both the 
public and private sectors. The crisis of our age is the mismanagement of financial risk 
within and between these sectors. The failure to manage risk has decimated global 
economies and shaken the foundations of the dismal science that guided policy.  
This paper presents two theses. First, the global economic crisis has brought 
unprecedented fiscal stress and has taxed our understanding of the interplay between 
public and private financial management. The uncertainty of the uncertainty of this 
interplay continues to vex policymakers and the market. Second, the disciplines that 
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1 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press, 2009), p. 415. 
2 Africa Child Policy Forum, ‘Child Rights at the Crossroads,’ Proceedings of the Global 
Conference on Research and Child Rights, November 30 to December 2, 2009, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, pp. 25-26. The appalling and deteriorating condition of Africa’s children is documented 
in Jaap E. Doek, A.K. Shiva Kumar, David Mugawe and Shimelis Tsegaye, eds., Child Poverty: 
African and International Perspectives (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009); The African Child Policy Forum, 
The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2008: How Child-Friendly are African Governments? (Addis 
Ababa: ACPF, 2009). 	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have shaped the strategies of economic development have been discredited and some 
might argue, are in full retreat. Crises can create innovative responses or at least a 
rethink of principles. I have less confidence in the former occurring but am assured of 
the value of returning to principles.  
Facing the worst global economic crisis since the depression of the 1930’s, there 
are stark resource constraints to promoting development, especially in Africa. The 
embarrassment of riches of the earlier years of this decade, some of which trickled to 
Africa, are unlikely, if ever, to be available again. While the top billions of the world are 
starting to see relief from this crisis, the bottom billion, many of whom are African 
children, are not seeing relief and are sliding back in to poverty—‘they are being left in 
the burning house.’
3 See Box 1. 
We live in financial times. Financial management is the issue of the day and our 
cloudy future. Public and private financial management have failed spectacularly and 
have caused the greatest pain to the most vulnerable global citizens—the children of 
poor countries. It is estimated that 89 million people have slipped below the $1.25 a day 
poverty line as a result of this crisis—most of who are African children. Over one billion 
people go to bed hungry. While the stock markets of many countries have recently  
experienced heady gains, the economic crisis is likely to linger for years. The global 
economy and especially its poorest members, face a perfect storm.  Resources have been 
leveraged and have evaporated, experts (if there are any at this stage willing to take a 
position) are uncertain about uncertainty, and most important, the institutions that  
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3 Ahead of the October 2009 G-20 meeting, Robert Zoellick observed that ‘While some [countries] 
are moving towards the exits, many are still being left behind in the burning house….We’re 
entering a new danger zone, not of freefall but of complacency,’ Financial Times, September 17, 
2009. Ahead of that meeting, the World Bank released its report on the  precarious state of 
development poor countries face going forward. See, The World Bank, ‘Protecting Progress: The 
Challenge Facing Low-Income Countries in the Global Recession,’ (Washington, D. C., September 
16, 2009). 
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Box 1 
 
The Global Crisis 
 
 
1%   (the decline in global GDP in 2008—first decline since the depression)  
 
9%  (the decline in global trade in 2008—the largest in 15 years) 
 
$10.5 trillion to $1.9 trillion        (82% decline in capital flows from 2007 to 2008) 
 
$30 billion to $13 billion   (net capital flows to low income countries from 07-09) 
 
$11.6 billion   (funding gap or social services for the poorest countries) 
 
40%   (decline in exports from Africa in 2008) 
 
7.9%   (decline in remittances to Africa) 
 
$59 billion   (external financing needs of low-income countries) 
 
89 million   (more people living in extreme poverty by end of 2010) 
 
350 million   (out of 650 million, the number of African’s living below $1.25 per day) 
 
122 million   (out of 163 million, the number of Africans who are ultra poor) 
 
1 billion plus  (number of people who go to bed hungry) 
 
$21.8 billion    (projected 2009 bonus pool at Goldman Sachs)  
 
 
 
Sources for Box 1.
4 
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4 The following lines in Box 1 beginning with $11.6 billion, $59 billion, 89 million, 350 million are 
from The World Bank, ‘Protecting Progress: The Challenge Facing Low-Income Countries in the 
Global Recession, (Washington, D.C., September 16, 2009).  The line in Box 1 beginning with 1 
billion plus is from ‘How to Feed the World,’ The Economist’ November 21, 2009, p. 14. The line in 
Box 1 beginning with 122 million is from Shimelis Tsegaye, Child Poverty in Africa: An Overview, 
(Addis Ababa: African Child Policy Forum, 2009), p. 2. [The ‘ultra poor’ are defined as people 
living on less than USD 0.50 a day. Ahmed et al., The World’s Most Deprived: Characteristics and 
Causes of Extreme Poverty and Hunger, International Food Policy Research Institute, 2020 
Discussion Paper 43, October 2007]. The line in Box 1 beginning with $21.8 billion is from 
‘Goldman apologizes for role in crisis,’ Financial Times, November 17, 2009. All other figures are 
from Martin Wolf, ‘New Dynamics,’ Financial Times, November 9, 2009, pp. 2-3. 	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should ameliorate the crises are weak and discredited.
5 The globe faces and must 
address, a LIE (Box 2).  
	 ﾠ
Box 2 
 
The Global LIE 
 
Leverage 
      Private sector 
  √ $600 trillion in derivative contracts in 2008 up from 100 trillion in 2000 
√ 25% of all mortgages in the US exceed asset value 
      Public sector 
  √ $12 trillion in bonds which OECD countries must issue in 2008, up  
                from $9 trillion in 2000 
  √ 13% of GDP, Russia’s loan guarantees to state companies  
  √ 10% of GDP, Turkey’s loan guarantees to state companies 
  √ 53% of GDP, UAE’s loan guarantees to state companies 
 
Institutions 
       Financial, accounting and audit firms  
  √ Central banks  
  √ Credit agencies  
       Regulatory agencies 
       Bretton Woods agencies 
       Accounting and Audit standards agencies 
       The Academy  
 
Experts 
       Accountants and Auditors 
       Academicians in public and private financial management, economists 
 
 
 
Sources for Box 2.
6	 ﾠ
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5 See Paul Krugman’s discussion on ‘Malign Neglect,’ in his The Return of Depression Economics 
and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: Norton, 2009), pp. 162-164.On the US Federal Reserve, Martin 
Wolf has opined that it is ‘an antihero….a serial bubble-blower, has distorted asset markets, and 
has inflicted monetary emissions on trading partners around the world….” Martin Wolf, Fixing 
Global Finance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 109. Claudio Borio, head of 
research for the Bank for International Settlements, warned the October 2009 G-20 meeting that 
policy makers have so focused on past risks that they will fail to spot new dangers—especially 
default of sovereign debt (Financial Times, ‘Will sovereign debt be the new subprime?’), p. 11.  
6 The estimate of the level of derivative contracts see, The Bank of International Settlements, 
‘Numbers Game,’ Financial Times, November 2, 2009, p. 4. On the level of US mortgages 
underwater see, Paul Krugman, ‘The Big Zero,’ The Global Edition of the New York Times, December 
29, 2009, p. 7. On the level of 2008 OECD bonds see, Martin Wolf, ‘New Dynamics,’ Financial 
Times, November 9, 2009, pp. 2-3. On the percentages of select country loan guarantees to firms as 	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In summarizing the cause of a financial crisis of an earlier age, Walter Bagehot, 
editor of The Economist, opined that it was due to ‘stupid people’ with ‘stupid money.’
7 
Perhaps it is different this time. The crisis has been caused by clever people with other 
people’s money who were stupid. It is different this time.
8 What emerges from the 
salmon sheets of the Financial Times is the uncertainty of uncertainty. We are in 
uncharted waters with severe global imbalances, with government’s taking on 
unprecedented debt and the public good of credit markets in the hands of firms who 
have known for decades that their financial innovations had risk that could not be 
measured, yet failed to disclose these risk in search of ‘above’ market returns. 
  Academe has much to blame for the crisis. Eminent professors of finance knew 
for nearly a quarter of a century before the sub-prime mortgage crisis that the risk of 
mortgage-back securities, one of the premier financial innovations of the 20
th century 
(certainly the most lucrative), could not be measured.
9  
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a percent of GDP see, Graham Bowley and Catherine Rampell, ‘Looking for the Next Debt Bomb,’ 
International Herald Tribune, December 2, 2009, p. 16. 
7 Walter Bagehot (editor-in-chief of the Economist in the 1860s), described many years ago the 
crisis of our age: ‘Much has been written about panics, and manias, much more than with the 
most outstretched intellect we are able to follow or conceive, but one thing is certain, that at 
particular times a great deal of stupid people have a great deal of stupid money….At 
intervals,…the money of these people—the blind capital, as we call it, of the country—is 
particularly large and craving; it sees for someone to devour it, and there is a “plethora”; it finds 
someone, and there is “speculation”; it is devoured, and there is “panic.”’ Cited in Wolf (2008), p. 
xi. 
   
8 One consolation of the crisis is that we may have a clearer rearview mirror—economic history.  
See, Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly (Princeton: New Jersey, 2009). The problem is the windshield is still foggy. 
9 In 1985, an eminent professor of finance from UCLA’s Anderson School of Business took leave 
for a year to develop an asset pricing model for Solomon Brothers for a new financial 
instrument—mortgage back securities. When he returned to UCLA the following year, he noted 
to his students in his advanced finance class (one of whom was me), that he was able to model 
interest rate risk, but not default or prepayment risk of principal. One reason the risk could not be 
modeled is the limitations of the APL computer language, which became a cult for investment 
bank quants, but could not hold a large enough matrix. Richard Bookstaber recounts the thirty 
year origin of the current crisis including the inability to model risk and Solomon Brother’s foray 
into securitizing debt see, A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of 
Financial Innovation (Hoboken: John Wiley and Son, 2007), pp. 35-50. Perhaps the best assessment 
of the financial innovation of securitized debt was Warren Buffet’s description of Solomon 
Brothers—as a casino with a restaurant outside (Buffet was the firm’s largest shareholder). The 
cornerstone of corporate finance, the capital asset pricing model, assumes that there is a linear 	 ﾠ 9	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Many call the current crisis, the ‘Minsky Moment’ after Hyman Minsky who 
predicted this twenty-five years ago in his analysis of Keynes. Minsky contends that 
there are two reasons for the current crisis: the gap in the toolbox of economists and the 
experience of economists. The deficiency in the toolbox is: 
[T]he missing step in the standard Keynesian theory…the explicit  
consideration of capitalist finance within a cyclical and speculative  
context. The missing experience was that unlike Keynes who had  
experience in the operations of capital markets, careers of most  
economists were made by combinations of purely academic work  
and government service.
10 
 
If Allan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve fully understood the inability to model the risk of 
collaterized debt obligations, would the chairman have maintained his belief that capital 
markets would self-regulate? 
  The crisis has shaken the foundations of economics and raised questions about 
its ability to effectively guide public policy.  
Today, not only is our economy in a shambles, but so too is the  
economic paradigm that predominated in the years before the  
crisis—or at least it should be.     Joseph Stiglitz
11 
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relationship between risk and return.  With mortgage-backed securities, the x axis, is clearly 
unclear. A former quant from Solomon Brothers, Emanuel Derman reflecting on his work at the 
firm, ‘that mortgage valuation models involve a witch’s brew of assumptions….and compared 
with the elegance of the Black-Scholes formalism, mortgage valuation is ugly.’ See, his My Life as 
a Quant: Reflections on Physics and Finance (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), p. 193. See also, 
Sanford Grossman, ‘An Analysis of the Implications for Futures and Stock Volatility of Program 
Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, Journal of Business, 61 no. 3, 1988, pp. 275-298. Prior to 
the 1987 market crash, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote ‘that the market is inherently unstable,’ 
because of ‘the present commitment to seemingly imaginative, and eventually disastrous, 
innovation in financial structure,’ ‘The 1929 Parallel,’ Atlantic Monthly, January 1987, cited in 
Bookstaber, p. 16. 
10 See, Hyman P. Minsky, John Maynard Keynes Second Edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008; 
First Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 126-127. See also his Stabilizing an 
Unstable Economy (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008; First Edition, Yale University Press, 1986). In 
his analysis twenty-four years ago of the work of Maynard Keynes, Minsky warned that Keynes 
had stressed in his Treatise on Money, which preceded The General Theory, that financial markets 
are subject to collapse and they drive economic growth.  
11 On the occasion of the founding of the Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) as an 
advisory board member of the INET,  ‘Needed: A New Economic Paradigm,’ Financial Times, 
August 19, 2010. 
 	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
  Has development economics lost its way? ….Too often research  
economists seem not to start with the key knowledge gaps facing 
development practitioners, but rather search for questions that  
can answer with the industry’s currently favorite tools.  The big 
questions facing policymakers are extremely complex. But is our  
present day research too narrowly focused—and too weak on  
external validity or scalability—to provide the kinds of insights  
policymakers need? I believe we need a more practical  
approach—one that is firmly grounded in the key knowledge 
gaps for development policy.      Robert Zoellick
12 
    
And if the failure of economics to inform policy were not enough, the bedrock of 
capitalism, accounting failed.  
  If you ask why the American financial system succeeds….at least my  
  reading of the history would be that there is no innovation more  
  important than that of generally accepted accounting principles: It  
  means that every investor gets to see information presented on a  
  comparable basis: that there is discipline on company managements 
  in the way they report and monitor their activities.
13 
 
The stove piped institutional framework of financial markets (academe, investment 
firms, accountancy firms, and government) failed. 
	 ﾠ The financial crisis of our age may, must, have a silver lining—a rethink of 
economic growth in all countries, not just poor countries, in terms of less is more, and 
the need for responsible sovereignty which holds agents (firms, foreign aid and 
governments themselves), accountable. Real growth, not passing bubbles, cannot be 
purchased on credit and must be based on savings and prudent borrowing for 
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12 ‘Democratizing Development Economics,’ Speech at Georgetown University, September 29, 
2010, emphasis added. The recent exchange between Paul Krugman and Niall Ferguson on the 
respective strengths of economics versus history for understanding the current crisis highlights 
humorously the decline of the dismal science. Ferguson opines, ‘A cat may look at a king, and 
sometimes a historian can challenge an economist.’ Gideon Rachman, ‘Sweep Economists off 
their Throne,’ Financial Times, September 7, 2010.      
13 Paul Krugman cites a speech by Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, given 
in 1999, See Krugman, 2009. Krugman argues that ‘just about everyone in a policy-making 
position at the time—believed in 1999: America has honest corporate accounting; this lets 
investors make good decisions, and also forces management to behave responsibly; and the result 
is a stable, well-functioning financial system.’ Goethe called double-entry bookkeeping one of the 
finest inventions of mankind and it is viewed by economic historians as a key innovation that 
facilitated the rise of capitalism.  	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productive assets, which are fiscally sustainable. There are ‘no shortcuts to progress’ for 
developing or developed countries.
14  Economic growth needs to be rethought, as does  
our understanding of financial markets, which underpin a capitalist economy.
15 
Financial markets are the fundamental driver and disrupter of a market economy.  
  The heterodox economist, Erik Reinert, concurs with Zoellick’s view that 
development economics has lost its way. Instead of focusing on the fundamentals of 
growth, development economics has focused on ‘palliative economics’ best exemplified 
by the MDGs.
16 
 
II.  Rethinking Development for the Bottom Billion 
          (most of who are the children of Africa) 
 
The Leverage of the Global LIE will take years to clear, and it awaits to be seen 
what the knock-down effects to Institutions and Experts will be. A silver lining of this 
crisis is that development for the bottom billion has to be rethought and done so quickly. 
Further, the financial crisis puts in sharp relief the need to consider the fiscal 
implications of foreign aid and the fiscal stress created by the MDGs. The hard budget 
constraint must drive development strategies. Hopefully a second effect of the crisis, 
which has decimated growth for the bottom billion, is the need to restart it and make it a 
priority. Unemployment is the worst disease in Africa and can only be addressed by 
growth.
17  
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14 Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (London: 
Heinemann, 1983). 
15 Christopher Cramer, Deborah Johnston, and Carlos Oya, ‘Briefing: Africa and the Credit 
Crunch: From Crisis to Opportunity?’ African Affairs, 2009, pp. 652-654. 
16 Erik S. Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (New York: 
Carroll and Graf, 2007). 
 
17 Paul Collier’s work on the bottom billion published before the financial crisis criticizes the 
MDGs on two grounds: the focus on social services not growth, and lumping the five billion poor 
together rather than singling out the bottom billion. He argues that while four billion poor maybe 
in a position to expand service provision, the bottom billion need growth. See his The Bottom 
Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 11, 191-192. 	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This is not the first, nor will it be the last, critique of the Millennium 
Development Goals.
18 What is different and dire this time, is that the global economic 
crisis has placed developing countries, particularly the poorest, in an even more 
precarious situation, which places an even higher premium for certainty and greater 
return from public resources (provided domestically and externally). Growth should be  
purchased the ‘old fashioned way’—you earn it, not borrow it—with prudent fiscal 
management. The only sustainability mentioned in the MDGs is environmental, not 
fiscal.  
Following Zoellick’s warning about complacency, complacency should not be 
addressed by reinvigorating past approaches which had dubious or limited impact. This 
paper concludes with a proposal to replace the MDGs by the DIGs—Decade 
Infrastructure Goals which would promote the certainty needed for development. 
 
Thesis 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are not the best bet for the bottom billion: 
they have never been adequately funded, are unlikely to be adequately funded, are fiscally 
unsustainable, and not the best investment for poor countries in terms of level and 
certainty of return. The global economic crisis requires a rethink of development, a return 
to fundamentals, a return to growth and a return to fiscal probity. 
 
 
III.  The Significance and Current Realities of Public Financial Management 
for Aid Dependent Countries 
 
Prudent public financial management is at the heart of a country’s development, 
which promotes and protects its future—its children. Africa ‘is a continent of children, 
where over 51% of the population is under 18 years and some countries like Nigeria, 
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18 Arvind Subramanian, ‘A Farewell to Alms,’ Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2007; William 
Easterly, ‘How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa,’ World Development, Vol. 
37, No. 1, 2009. 	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Ethiopia, and Uganda have 55-60% of the population as children.’
19 Understanding how 
public financial management supports the rights of the African child, indeed the rights 
of Africa’s citizens, must begin with an understanding of endogenous and exogenous 
factors of growth. Foreign aid is primarily an international intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer—it is exogenous. How do these exogenous resources combine with endogenous 
resources and affect a country’s development path? Public financial management is at 
the core of understanding this relationship. Public financial management needs to be 
demystified if governments are to maintain the sovereignty of their systems and civil 
society organizations are to press for transparency and accountability for those who will 
inherit the future. Public financial management can be summarized by three principles 
and two decisions (Box 3). 
 
Box 3 
Principles and Decisions of Public Financial Management 
First principle 
pursuit of public policy within a hard budget constraint 
Subsidiary principles 
optimal allocation between policies 
& 
efficiency of policy implementation 
 
The two decisions 
 
Financing & Investment 
 
Aaron Wildavsky’s seminal work, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, sums up 
the political complexity of the above principles and thus the need for simplicity in the 
financial systems to execute policy.
20 Another classic in public finance but written by a 
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19 Africa Child Policy Forum, ‘Child Rights at the Crossroads,’ p. 25. 
20 Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process Fourth Edition (Boston: Little Brown, 
1984). Aaron also stressed the value of simple and clear budget formats in his ‘A Budget for All 
Seasons: Why the Traditional Budget Lasts,’ Public Administration Review 38 (6), 1978.  	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practitioner (Hugh Dalton, former Chancellor of the Exchequer), notes the dualism, and 
thus challenge of this field: 
Every writer, who aims at organizing a general discussion of public  
finance, must be conscious of a conflict between two personalities,  
those of the practical and of the analytical man. And, in seeking to  
resolve this conflict, he is in danger of getting the worst of both worlds,  
missing both the perfection of theory, boldly guided by pure reason,  
and the wisdom of statesmanship, cautiously guided by administrative  
officialdom…. Studies in public finance have…. a special fascination,  
but for the same reason, an excess of abstraction is apt, in this sphere,  
to seem especially unreal and an excess of conventional rule-of-thumb  
especially half-witted.
21 
 
Public Financial Management is the management of illusion.
22  There is never 
enough. It is also an elusive balance between abstraction and calculation. A 
development strategy, however, should not be an illusion.  
Financial management, public and private, involves two decisions: financing and 
investment. The distinguishing feature between public and private sector financial 
management is the relative weight of the two decisions.  The finance decision outweighs 
the investment decision in the public sector while the obverse holds in the private 
sector.
23 For the private sector, the investment decision predominates while the capital 
structure tags behind and can be accessed with market share. Despite the long debate 
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21 Hugh Dalton served as a Minister of the Crown for eleven years and through two turbulent 
years (1945-1947), was Chancellor of the Exchequer. See his Principles of Public Finance, first 
edition 1922, fourth edition 1954, London, and Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 3-4. 
22 I am indebted to Perran Penrose for this insight. Aaron Wildavsky made a similar argument. 
See Wildavsky (1984), p. 10. 
23 The financing decision for the public sector refers to the aggregate level of resources and their 
composition (domestic revenue/loan; external grant/loan). Our reference here is broader than 
financing as ‘below the line’ funding of the deficit either through external grant or 
domestic/foreign loan.  	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over the capital structure of the firm, (the composition of equity, debt and retained 
earnings continues), it is assumed to be a straightforward calculation.
24  
In public financial management, the financing decision predominates. The public 
budget, which is the most important policy document of a government, begins with an 
appropriation, the legal authority to raise revenue, which in turn provides the legal 
authority to spend.
25  Taxes are compulsory; the revenues of a firm are not. Public 
financial management, thus begins with the first principle above—pursuit of policy 
within a hard budget constraint (a finance decision) and in turn allocating revenues 
between policies (an investment decision) and efficiently implementing policy (an 
investment decision). While capital structure may be irrelevant to the firm a la 
Modigliani, it is of enormous consequence to fiscal sustainability of developed countries, 
and is a defining decision for aid dependent countries.  
Ironically, the MDGs promote a private not public sector balance to the finance 
and investment decision. For the MDGs, the investment decision (social sector 
expenditure) outweighs the financing decision as sustainability going forward is left for 
the future.
26 
IV.  The MDG Financing Decision 
 
  The entire logic of foreign aid is explicitly on the basis that not only does  
  aid provide additional resources to a country, it provides additional  
  fiscal resources. If those additional resources are made conditional on  
  fiscal expansion and that expansion is in the recurrent budget, and if  
  because of the constraint that [conditional increases in government  
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24 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory 
of Investment,’ American Economic Review 53, 1958, pp. 261-297. They postulated that the capital 
structure of the firm was irrelevant because the risk of bankruptcy from debt is balanced by the 
tax shield of debt. 
25 Distinguishing public and private financial management can best be seen in the dominance of 
the budget in the former, and marginal cost of the latter. 
26 As Arvind (2007) notes, ‘Aid advocates…act as if the long-run problems caused by aid can be 
fixed independently.’ 	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  expenditure must be financed by increases in domestic revenue or  
  reductions in other government expenditure] the resources do not fund 
  recurrent expenditure expansion, the aid may cause serious management 
  problems for the recipient country.
27 
   
The MDGs finance decisions focuses on how resources (domestic and foreign) 
are brought to the budget. The finance decision can not be divorced from the investment 
decision, as prudent management of the budget requires a sustainable aggregate and 
composition (balance of recurrent and capital expenditure) with a matching of 
appropriate sources of finance (domestic/foreign; grant/loan). As summarized in the 
quote by Penrose above, foreign aid programs, especially those focused on MDG 
priorities, have largely ignored how external resources are incorporated in the budget 
and the fiscal stress of conditionalities that focus on social expenditures (MDGs) that 
require recurrent outlays and domestic revenue mobilization. The most expensive MDG, 
education, exacerbates fiscal stress and diverts resources from capital investments, 
which promote a virtuous cycle of sustainable growth: capital investment leading to 
growth (profits, wages, employment), which generates domestic revenue that provides 
resources (more investment, more revenue, absorption of foreign aid, more social 
services).  
The MDGs pose three serious issues to the already precarious fiscal position of 
poor countries: (1) they focus on social expenditures that have questionable returns to 
growth (e.g. primary education); (2) they don’t focus on infrastructure investments 
which have demonstrable effects on growth that can generate domestic revenue 
(assuming the installation recurrent costs can be covered); and, (3) they ignore the need 
for domestic revenue to absorb the foreign aid targeted to social expenditure and 
supportive of capital expenditure (domestically and/or foreign financed).  The 
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27 Perran Penrose, ‘European Commission Budget Support Programmes: Nature, Dialogue, and 
Design,’ June 2008, p. 39. My analysis of the financing and investment decisions of the MDGs 
draws on this work.  	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‘governor’ which limits the expansion of a sustainable budget, is domestic revenue, 
which constrains the recurrent budget. Foreign aid often focuses on the capital budget 
and neglects the impact of its grants and loans on the recurrent budget—SEP--someone 
else’s problem—and payment.
28 Lawrence Summers has opined that fiscal sustainability 
is one the three pillars of economic growth.  
I would suggest that the rate at which countries grow is substantially  
determined by three things: their ability to integrate with the global  
economy through trade and investment; their capacity to maintain 
sustainable government finances; and their ability to put in place  
an institutional environment in which contracts can be enforced  
and property rights can be established. 
29 
 
So a prudent fiscal policy, or fiscal consolidation, is according to Summers, essential for 
growth. Ricardo Hausmann has disagreed and argues that ‘macro policies are not a 
growth strategy…but are really about avoiding crises.
30  He argues further that macro 
policies ‘are about keeping the economy close to its potential, to its speed limit…but it is 
not about raising the speed limit.’
31 Hausmann’s analysis does not address heavily aid 
dependent African countries which have Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (PRSPs) 
as part of their aid conditionalities. While he accepts in principle that there are different 
paths to development, he has not examined the role and composition of foreign aid and 
fiscal consolidation thereby missing much of the African development story. As 
Hausmann notes, the ‘Perotti’ effect that expenditure cuts lead to growth is not proven.
32 
But for aid dependent countries restraining the growth of expenditures that add fiscal 
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28 In Harvard’s Executive Program in Public Financial Management, Perran Penrose has 
reminded government officials that the heart of public financial management is the management 
of fixed costs as they drive the deficit.  
29 Lawrence Summers, Godkin Lecture, Harvard University, 2005, emphasis added.  
30 Ricardo Hausmann, ‘Economic Growth: Shared Beliefs, Shared Disappointments?’ Faculty 
Research Paper, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2006, p. 10. 
31 Hausmann, p. 10. 
32 Hausmann, p. 9. 	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stress with little or no (and possibly negative) contributions to growth and focusing on a 
prudent investment program, does promote growth.
33  
 
V.  The MDG Financing Decision: Budget Support 
 
In terms of the financing decision, how does foreign aid enter the budget? There 
are two issues here: what expenditures should it fund and not fund; and, how should it 
be treated in government financial statements? Foreign aid is typically delivered 
through two vehicles--project or budget support. Project support may or may not be 
brought to the budget and some multilaterals provide other forms of off-budget support 
(e.g. social rehabilitation funds).
34 A separate macroeconomic issue, which will be 
discussed below, is whether foreign aid is even brought to the budget. 
  The principal means of funding the MDGs, which is preferred by governments 
and foreign aid alike, is budget support. The treatment of foreign aid loans is clear, it is 
located ‘below the line’ in government financial statements as a source of financing for 
capital or recurrent expenditure. The treatment of foreign grants is not clear as they can 
be placed above the line as a source of revenue (similar but still different) from domestic 
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33 Hausmann’s analysis ignores the government reaction function to foreign aid, see fn. 48. 
34 In 1996 in Ethiopia, I introduced the concept of ‘channels’ in terms of three capillaries of public 
money: channel 1--treasury, channel 2—foreign project support, channel 3—earmarked foreign 
transfers (e.g. Productive Safety Nets Program, HIV/AIDs programs).  As the financial reform 
project I directed was closing, the relative size of the capillaries at the ‘front line’ of service 
delivery (the weredas—districts) was approximately 30% in #1, 12% in #2, and 58% in #3. As I 
noted at that time to the Minister of Finance, the twelve year PFM reform we implemented with 
the government, was covering less and less of public resources. Unfortunately the channel 
framework, was elaborated and distorted with some foreign aid agencies claiming their money 
was channel #1a, etc. The channel framework was meant to describe funds flow not withstanding 
the fungibility of money. The concern of foreign aid agencies with ‘tracking their money’ under 
budget support which comingles external grant and sometimes external loan with domestic 
resources produces some rather odd discussions. One potential groundbreaking innovation in 
public financial management emerging from a perceptive colleague of mine attending one of the 
endless public expenditure reviews in Ethiopia, was to ‘bar code the birr’ which had been 
converted from the foreign exchange of foreign aid, and then do comprehensive aerial mapping 
of Ethiopia to see where the funds went. This PFM innovation unfortunately is at odds with host 
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revenue, or below the line like loans as a source of financing.
35  The principal argument 
for treating grants above the line is that like domestic revenue, they increase the net 
worth of government. Foreign grants, however, are not always delivered on schedule, 
which disrupts government budgeting.
36 In Ethiopia, grants from multilateral foreign 
aid are notoriously unreliable. Viewed often by recipient governments as ‘free money,’ 
the complementary government resources needed to install and maintain grant-funded 
activities are not free. Government borrowing for grant funds that have not arrived but 
for which their intended programs have begun, is also not free. To the extent grants 
reflect the agenda of foreign aid and are not part of a synergistic budget, they can 
fragment and weaken the budget. The treatment of the grants as revenue or source of 
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35 Peter Heller noted the problem of grant financed recurrent wage expenditure but argues that 
the principal problem with grants being treated above the line as revenue rather than below the 
line as financing, is aggregate demand pressures. He goes on to argue that treating grants as 
revenue should be ‘heavily weighted toward highly productive, growth-engendering 
investments in physical infrastructure and human capital (‘Pedantry or How Does the IMF 
Account,’ Finance and Development, December 2004, p. 28).’ While this argument can be made for 
lumpy capital investments where recurrent maintenance costs can be deferred or ignored until 
another grant, the same can not be said about investment in recurrent wage expenditures (teacher 
salaries) supporting human capital investments which would be very difficult to defer or ignore. 
Heller does not specify what he means by investments in human capital nor does he engage in 
the debate about the returns to growth of investment in education.  
35 One technique for adequately budgeting services is to look at the recurrent cost coefficient of 
particular services. These coefficients can have wide variations by service and are not hard and 
fast rules. They do provide rules of thumb to allow rapid scanning of a budget bid to determine 
its composition.  
36 In fiscally devolved countries with significant vertical imbalance, the difference between 
domestic revenue and foreign grants is stark. In Ethiopia, the transfers from the central 
government to regional government comprise approximately 85% of their revenue. If a region is 
allocated a foreign grant, the local currency component is offset (though not fully).  Given the 
uncertainty of the grant, several regions started to refuse foreign grants—a birr was better than a 
buck--because it was reliable, unconditional, and could be used for any expenditure including 
salaries. By 2003, the grants from the African Development Bank were so unreliable and thus so 
costly to regions through the offset, the Ethiopian government decided to not include them in the 
calculation of the inter-regional transfer, effectively excluding them from the budget. In mid-
decade, the European Commission initiated a program to transparently discuss its aid program 
with recipient governments and their development partners. The EC hosted a conference in 
Addis to conduct this gem gema (self-criticism), and the Belgian consulting firm conducting the 
review ended its presentation with a striking slide—‘the EC: an important, but unreliable 
partner.’ During this period, the EC was the largest provide of grants to Ethiopia (approximately 
$140 million per year). Of course another source of uncertainty of foreign aid grants are the 
conditions that recipients not be in conflict—a condition that is not always achieved on the 
continent.  	 ﾠ 20	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finance is also at the discretion of the IMF, which behooves recipient governments to be 
conservative in their treatment (locate grants below the line). 
  Having established where to place grants in the financial statement, prudent 
financial management requires matching appropriate sources of finance 
(domestic/foreign) to the four types of expenditure: Recurrent/wage, Recurrent/operating 
and maintenance (o&m), Recurrent/statutory and Capital. Since budget support is 
comingled with treasury funds, planners and budgeters cannot easily match the 
composition of expenditure with the source of finance. Prudent financial management 
should observe the following guidelines of matching expenditure and source of financing. 
R/wage and R/statutory expenditures should be funded only by reliable domestic revenue 
(not domestic loans or foreign aid). R/o&m is more complicated as essential maintenance 
should be financed by domestic revenue but small lumpy items (e.g. nursing supplies, 
drugs, teaching materials) that can be easily stockpiled may well be funded by foreign 
aid, especially grants. Capital expenditures, with some exceptions, can be funded by all 
sources of financing (domestic/foreign; grant/loans).
37 Even if grants are treated as above 
the line, they should not be used to fund R/wage or R/statutory expenditures (these are 
long-term liabilities).  
Public expenditure should be viewed in terms of quality as well as quantity. 
Quality is a function of sectoral allocation and composition. A primary school needs a 
balanced composition of the four types of expenditures—Rwage, Rstatutory, Ro&m and 
Capital. Most services in poor countries are not adequately provided both in quantity or 
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37 The traditional definition of a capital expenditure is based on its source of financing (non-
current revenue) rather than its character (asset with a life of more than one year with a threshold 
value). 	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quality as wages often crowd out vital o&m.
38 Even where wages predominate, the 
salary bill may be inadequate if the pupil/teacher ratio is too high.  
The MDGs focus on pro-poor expenditures in the social sectors where recurrent 
wage expenditures (e.g. teacher and health care worker salaries) predominate.
39 While 
the goal of expanding social services is laudable (though education, especially primary, 
is questionable in terms of growth), the current financing strategy is not viable.  It is 
imprudent to finance long-term recurrent liabilities with short-term volatile financing 
(foreign aid, especially loans). Budget support, which arguably can be turned off quicker 
than it can be turned on, reinforces this volatility. Prudent financial management 
requires that a government not run a structural deficit (the gap between domestic 
revenue and recurrent wage and statutory expenditures, and operating and 
maintenance).
40 While there are creative strategies to match the expenditure exposure of 
salaries to the receipt of external assistance, (e.g. placing employees on conditional 
contracts tied to aid flows), the culture of employment in most African countries is one 
of permanence.
41 The social and political turmoil that might be created by the 
redundancy of large numbers of educated teachers and health care workers especially in 
the rural areas, is a political calculus recipient governments (and military planners), 
should ponder.
42 
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38 One technique for adequately budgeting services is to look at the recurrent cost coefficient of 
particular services. These coefficients can have wide variations by service and are not hard and 
fast rules. They do provide rules of thumb to allow rapid scanning of a budget bid to determine 
its composition.  
39 Perran Penrose has informed my thinking on this topic. 
40 The domestic revenue should be conservatively estimated and exclude one-time non-tax 
revenue such as sales of assets.  
41  The Government of Kenya is now placing new teachers on fixed contracts.  
42 Ted Robert Gurr argued that a major precipitating factor of social unrest is when rising 
expectations are not met. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970). Are the MDGs raising unrealistic expectations and thus the prospect of revolutions 
in poor countries, which in turn divert the very resources needed to fund them to the Millennium 
Terrorist Goals (MTGs)?  	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
Table 1
43 
Country	 ﾠ Fiscal	 ﾠYear	 ﾠ
Actuals	 ﾠ
Structural	 ﾠSurplus	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
(Deficit)	 ﾠ(%)	 ﾠ
Capital	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Recurrent	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Ratio	 ﾠ(%)	 ﾠ
Ethiopia	 ﾠ 2006/07	 ﾠ 21.2	 ﾠ 52	 ﾠ
Ghana	 ﾠ 2005	 ﾠ 21.4	 ﾠ 64.2	 ﾠ
Liberia	 ﾠ 2007/08	 ﾠ 13.7	 ﾠ 13.8	 ﾠ
Rwanda	 ﾠ 2005	 ﾠ (25)	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ
Tanzania	 ﾠ 2005/06	 ﾠ (50.1)	 ﾠ 32.6	 ﾠ
Uganda	 ﾠ 2004/05	 ﾠ (1.5)	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ
   
  Table 1 presents the fiscal position of six African countries in terms of their 
structural surplus/deficit and the capital to recurrent expenditure ratio. Two 
observations can be made from these fiscal snapshots from the latest actual, not 
projected, data garnered from an IMF Article 4 consultation. First, the donor darlings 
(Rwanda and Tanzania) ran significant structural deficits although their capital to 
recurrent expenditure ratios presents a mixed picture (Tanzania is close to the 30% rule 
of thumb while Rwanda exceeds it).
44 For fiscal year 2000/01 when Uganda was a donor 
darling, it ran a modest structural deficit of 5.2% but its capital to recurrent ratio was an 
unsustainable (79%).
45 The other countries in Table 1 are running structural surpluses 
but unsustainable capital/recurrent expenditure ratios. A single fiscal year snapshot of 
actual expenditure and revenue does not tell a complete story and one must look at 
trends over time. Short-term spikes in capital investment may be sustainable overtime 
(e.g. expansion of Ethiopia’s hydroelectric capacity). Beyond the statement of 
government operations, one would also have to examine the utilization rates of capital 
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43 Sources for Table 1 are from the Summary of Central Government Operations from the most 
recently publically available IMF Article 4 consultations: Ethiopia 2008, Ghana, 2007, Liberia 
2008, Rwanda 2006, Tanzania 2007, Uganda 2006. The trend to present the SOG in terms of a 
category of ‘pro-poor’ expenditures is unfortunate since it lumps together the composition of 
expenditure (Rw, Ro&m, Rstat and Capital), which prevents assessing the structural deficit. 
44 A rule of thumb in budgeting is that capital expenditures should not, on average, exceed thirty 
percent of expenditure for an activity, in order to leave headroom in the budget for 
complementary recurrent expenditures.  I am indebted to Mike Stevens for this observation. 
45 Summary of Central Government Operations, IMF Article 4 consultation, Uganda 2002. 	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investment and maintenance of prior assets. Tanzania’s structural deficit is simply 
imprudent.  
The ambitious five-year sector development programs (SDPs) in education, 
health and water introduced in Ethiopia in 1997 illustrate the effects of capital 
imbalances created by a foreign aid shock. These SDPs featured capital to recurrent 
ratios that ranged from fifty-four to over one hundred thirty percent a year over the five 
year program. Five years later, a good portion of the resources had not been absorbed, 
but more seriously, a number of facilities that were built stood abandoned and pad 
locked for lack of staff and funds for operating and maintenance.
46 These five-year plans 
morphed into six and then eight year plans. This picture may well be repeated on a 
grander scale on the continent should the MDG social sector targets be pursued. 
The MDGs promote imprudent management of recurrent and capital 
expenditure. As a lumpy investment, capital can be a candidate, with some exceptions, 
for foreign aid funding (grant and loan). The heterodox economist, Erik Reinert, 
appropriately describes these imbalanced foreign funded social expenditure programs: 
One novelty of the MDGs approach lies in the emphasis on foreign  
financing of domestic social and redistribution policies, rather than on  
domestic financing by the developing countries themselves. Disaster  
relief, which used to be of a temporary nature, now finds a more  
permanent form in the MDGs….[T]his approach will put a large number  
of nations permanently ‘on the dole’—a system similar to ‘welfare  
colonialism.'
47 
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46 In one discussion about the health SDP, an aid official noted that ‘all the program simply 
needed was an additional 10,000 nurses.’  
47 Erik S. Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (New York: 
Carroll and Graf, 2007), p. 240. Reinert echos Peter (Lord) Bauer’s argument that ‘external 
doles…tend to bias the development process in directions based on external prototypes which 
are often inappropriate…[which] retards development rather than promotes it….’ See Peter 
Bauer, The Development Frontier: Essays in Applied Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), pp. 103,105. 
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The costing studies of the MDGs focus on whether foreign aid will be there to 
fund the MDGs. What is not addressed in this literature is how expanded social services 
can be sustained long term with domestic resources. The assumption is that the ramping 
up of these services will have been initiated and sustained by foreign aid.
48 
 
VI.  The MDG Financing Decision: the Government Reaction Function 
 
Even if it is assumed that the MDGs are an appropriate strategy and direct 
budget support is an appropriate instrument for their implementation, will recipient 
governments respond appropriately? Can budget support in some, if not most 
circumstances, delay the flow of foreign aid targeted for the MDGs? The government 
‘reaction function’ to an aid resource shock can be viewed as a four-cell matrix: 
Absorb/Not Absorb forex, Spend/Not Spend local currency.
49 A study by the IMF 
showed how five African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Uganda) managed their MDG/Budget support aid shocks.
50 These governments either 
did not absorb and built reserves, or did not fully absorb and did not fully spend. 
Ethiopia, which is the poorest and most populous of the five, and on a relative basis 
would be the largest recipient country if MDG goals were funded, pursued a strategy of 
not absorb, not spend.
51 
To absorb and spend is the textbook response to aid: the government  
Increases investment, and aid finances the resulting rise in net imports. 
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48 Nancy Birdsall, ‘Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings, in William Easterly, ed., 
Reinventing Foreign Aid (Cambridge: MIT Press 2008), p. 536; Michael Clemens, Charles J. Kenny, 
and Todd Moss, ‘The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and 
Development Success,’ Working Paper 40 (Center for Global Development, September 2004).
  
49 Perran Penrose presented the ‘government reaction function’ to resource shocks in the Public 
Financial Management Executive Education program at Harvard University, July 2007.  
50 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Macroeconomics of Managing Increased Aid Inflows: 
Experiences of Low-Income Countries and Policy Implications,’ August 8, 2005. 
51 Peter Heller and Sanjeev Gupta, ‘Challenges in Expanding Development Assistance,’ IMF 
Discussion Paper 02/05 March 2002. They estimated that if Ethiopia received their MDG 
entitlement, the foreign aid budget would be five times the domestically funded budget.  	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….In the sample countries, however, a full absorb-and-spend response  
was found to be surprisingly rare. Typically, there was a reluctance to  
  embrace absorption—and the consequent real appreciation—due, at  
  least in part, to concerns about competitiveness.
52 
 
These five countries demonstrate that fiscal sustainability is often a higher 
priority than the MDGs for recipient countries. Given the likelihood of diminishing 
foreign aid going forward, and the bottom twenty-five countries remaining in the 
burning house, what little budget support is made available, will in all likelihood be 
husbanded by governments to manage liquidity shocks first, with social sector 
expenditures a distant priority.  
 
VII.  The MDG Financing Decision:  
Public Financial Management Reform as a Conditionality 
 
While one does not want here to get down in the ‘weeds’ of how to change PFM 
systems, it is essential to understand that the budgeting process itself becomes important 
as a precondition of the flow of aid.  Budget support has heightened the concerns of 
foreign aid agencies with fiduciary risk and thus the overall ‘ratings’ of a recipient 
country’s public financial management.
53  Budget support was promoted in part, as a 
means of reducing the transaction costs of delivering foreign aid. Budget support, 
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52 IMF, ‘The Macroeconomics of Managing Increased Aid Inflows,’ 2005, p. 3. 
53 The expanded use of the Public Expenditure Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework and 
its evolution from a diagnostic, to an implicit conditionality, illustrates this trend. The PEFA 
framework has many deficiencies but the most relevant here is its failure to consider the quality 
of the capital and recurrent budgets. A PEFA is a partial instrument for measuring the 
‘throughput’ performance of a country PFM system. It does not consider the sources of 
performance, systems and their execution, nor does it examine the outcome of—quality and 
impact of expenditure. PEFA’s do not measure fiduciary risk. A ‘Country Integrated Fiduciary 
Assessment’ (CIFA) instrument has recently been introduced in the PFM field to measure risk. 
One example a CIFA methodology is DFID, ‘Managing Fiduciary Risk When Providing Financial 
Aid,’ How to Note, December 2009. 	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however, brings the transaction costs of conditionalities one of which is reform of the 
recipient country’s public financial management—often to their detriment.
54  
Foreign aid often promotes, indeed requires, African governments to adopt 
dubious reforms under the guise of ‘international best practice.’ While extolling the 
virtue of the ‘getting the basics’ of PFM implemented, foreign aid often undermines the 
very basics with prescriptions of advanced techniques that are difficult for even 
developed countries to adopt and have not proven their utility.
55 
While one always takes risks in generalizing, especially in a topic as contextual 
as public financial management, Ian Linert’s comparative study of Francophone and 
Anglophone public financial management in Africa is instructive.
56 Linert contends that 
the systems are sound but lack discipline. My experience from over two decades of 
hands-on, field-in work on PFM on the continent as well as directing an executive 
program in PFM at Harvard to senior government officials, many from Africa, supports 
Linert’s argument.  
Foreign aid should promote, not undermine, the discipline of recipient 
government PFM systems. The all too-frequent practice by foreign aid agencies of 
tinkering or parachuting in duplicate systems, is disruptive, increases risk and erodes 
sustainability. These interventions are particularly detrimental when they accelerate the 
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54 When foreign aid introduced the Sectoral Development Programs in health and education in 
Ethiopia in 1997, they also introduced a completely parallel reporting system with separate 
budget classification, chart of accounts, and computer system. This activity effectively segmented 
the local finance offices into a foreign aid shop and a domestic shop. The segmentation not only 
made it difficult to have a comprehensive picture of the region’s finances, it also delayed by at 
least two years, the implementation of the government’s civil service reform in public financial 
management.  
55 The assessment of the use of accrual accounting in the National Health Service in the United 
Kingdom has shown very mixed results. See, Howard Mellett, Neil Marriot, and Louise 
Macniven, ‘Devolution, Accruals Accounting and Asset Management in NHS Wales,’ Financial 
Accountability and Management, Volume 25, No. 4, pp. 435-450.  
56 Ian Linert, ‘Comparison between Two Public Expenditure Management Systems in Africa,’ IMF 
Working Paper 03/2 (Washington D.C., March 2002). Mike Stevens made the same argument a 
year earlier, ‘Institutional and Incentive Issues in Public Financial Management Reform in Poor 
Countries,’ The World Bank, October 12, 2004. 	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departure of the best officials to foreign aid programs. Government financial systems 
should not be used for the perceived need for quick conditionality hits or as a quid pro 
quo for budget support. PFM is sovereign territory. As sovereign territory, boundaries 
need to be clearly defined and if need be, aggressively protected. The basics work.  
Public financial management is an essential service. As with teacher and health 
care worker salaries, its recurrent operations should not be resourced or dependent 
upon volatile foreign resources. When Ethiopia unveiled its in-house designed Civil 
Service Reform Program to the foreign aid community in 1996, it requested assistance, 
but also pursued a very clear strategy of ‘divide and manage’ of foreign aid to their 
financial reform. The government wanted to remain firmly in the driver’s seat and 
wanted no single donor/lender to have undue influence nor did they want to borrow 
for the reform.   
National ownership of PFM is not an academic issue. Not only does it go to the 
heart of sovereignty, it refocuses attention to national development priorities, not 
external preferences. African governments need basic financial control now to deliver 
the limited, and quite possibly, declining resources to the remotest capillaries of rural 
development. They need plateaus of financial management that are stable and 
understood, managed and funded by African governments.
 57 African governments 
don’t need summits of financial management--cutting or bleeding edge financial 
management. Sophisticated systems raise risk, often don’t work, or take years to make 
function (e.g. the Integrated Financial Management Information Systems--IFMISs).
58 By 
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57 Stephen Peterson, ‘Chapter 4: Reforming the Regions: A Model Emerges,’ in Its Possible 
(Yitchalal) Reforming Ethiopia, forthcoming.  This book presents the Four Drivers of Public Sector 
Reform (context, ownership, purpose and strategy) which explains reform writ large as well as 
the PFM subset.  
 
58 Stephen Peterson, ‘Automating Public Financial Management in Developing Countries,’ in 
Anwar Shah, editor, Budgeting and Budgetary Institutions (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 
2007). The failure or under performance of IFMISs and large-scale financial information systems 
have been extensively documented: William Dorotinsky, ‘Technology and Corruption: the Case 
of FMIS,’ The World Bank The World Bank (2002); ‘Design and Implementation of Financial 
Management Systems: An African Perspective,’ Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 25; Jack 	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some estimates, it takes ten to fifteen years to implement a PFM reform and seven to 
nine years in Africa to implement an Integrated Financial Management Information 
System (IFMIS).
59 What is most important and often overlooked, is that whether a 
country’s accounts have been changed from modified-cash to accrual accounting has 
little or no, and quite possibly negative, impact in the short, medium and long term for 
the quality of life of its children.
60 
There is considerable confusion in the PFM field about reform. I would submit 
that there are two dimensions of PFM reform, First, PFM reform has four components: 
recognition, improvement, change and sustainability (RICS).
61 The need (a deficiency) 
has to be recognized, which in turn requires a decision of whether to address it by 
improving or changing the system. Once the deficiency is addressed, then the new 
configuration has to be sustained. Much of the thinking about PFM reform is focuses on 
change rather than the other three components. The second dimension of PFM reform is 
separate out systems from their execution.
62 To often, the tendency of the PFM 
conditionalities of aid, and PFM reforms, have focused on systems, especially the 
introduction of techniques of international best practice.  
Financial reform does not have to cost a lot and indeed is often about improving 
the execution of existing systems. The amounts of foreign assistance allocated in some 
countries to financial reform could be better spent on tube wells, or other needed 
infrastructure, with change to spare. Financial reform is critical; however, rather than 
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Diamond, Pokar Khemani, ‘Introducing Financial Management Information Systems in 
Developing Countries,’ IMF Working Paper No. 05/196, 2005.  
59 SIDA, Public Finance Management in Development Co-Operation—A Handbook for Sida Staff, 2007. 
60 See fn. 55. 
61 Stephen Peterson, ‘Chapter 4: Reforming the Regions.’ 
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overspending on it, governments and foreign aid agencies should pursue cost effective 
approaches, and get down to the business of delivering resources to services. Children 
count, accrual accounting doesn’t. There are diminishing and even negative returns, to 
public financial management reform.  
  Ironically while improving the management of public expenditure is frequently a 
conditionality of budget support, improving domestic revenue mobilization is not.  
While recognizing the political correctness of foreign aid not raising the bill of sustaining 
the investment, improving domestic revenue mobilization goes to the heart of fiscal 
sustainability and should be a quid pro quo of foreign resource transfers.  
Finally, budget support, like the MDGs, picks winners and losers. Budget 
support sidesteps civil society organizations (CSOs). With the decline of global 
resources, would it not be prudent to build a portfolio of channels (government, CSOs, 
corporate responsibility), to finance and deliver services, especially to the most 
vulnerable groups? Reducing the channels for delivering services to the hard to reach 
rural poor reduces redundancy and increases risk. To what extent has budget support 
also weakened the advocacy and targeted assistance to children in Africa?  
Given the likelihood of diminished, non-terrorist tied foreign assistance, there 
will be strong pressures for CSOs to fill the gap. Diversifying aid delivery from budget 
support to forms which strength CSOs, promotes an institutional safety net that may 
help the bottom billion and those in the burning house, weather the storm.
63 
 
VIII.  The MDGs Financing Decision  
(There is no There There)  
 
Jeff Sachs has argued that the core problem with development is the woefully 
inadequate level of foreign aid to developing countries (using a garden hose when a fire 
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63 The role of budget support in strengthening regimes that are hostile to CSOs is a topic for 
another paper.  	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hose is needed).
64 Even if one agrees with this analysis, the global resource reality is that 
the resources simply are not there, and are likely to decline, and developing countries 
will have to do more with less foreign aid.  
Peter Heller and Sanjeev Gupta pointed out seven years ago two financing 
problems with the MDGs: that poor countries would not be able to effectively absorb the 
resource shock, and that the resources would not be forthcoming.
65 They predicted that 
developed countries were unlikely to achieve the MDG contribution target of seven 
tenths of one percent of their GDP, and by 2012 they would have to reduce their foreign 
aid budgets going forward to fund their entitlement programs.
66 Entitlements in the 
OECD countries are a resource goal that is clearly on the agenda for the millennium—
the Millennium Entitlement Goals (MEGs). Heller and Gupta did not foresee other 
demands on the public resources of developed countries: terrorism, climate, stimulus, 
and unwinding global leverage (Box 4). The 800-pound gorilla in the room are the 
MUGs (the Millennium Unwinding Goals), reducing public and private debt, which will 
be the number one priority for global resources for years, if not decades to come. If this  
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64 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of our Times (New York: Penguin, 2005). 
He also points out the inappropriateness of the extensive list of conditionalities.  
65 Heller and Gupta (2002). When writing their paper in 2002, they noted that OECD countries 
would be pulling out of the 2000 recession within a few years and could possibly meet the seven-
tenths of GDP contribution target from mid-decade to 2012. Their predication did not last five 
years.  As an example of the current crises, Ireland Aid has reduced its foreign aid in their 2010 
calendar year budget by 25%. 
66 In analyzing the level of ODA flows, one has to separate out military assistance, relief, 
development assistance, and trade credits.  	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Box 4 
 
More Pressing Millennium Goals 
 
MEGs: Millennium Entitlement Goals 
√ For the U.S.: 10% of GDP in 2008; 18% in 2050 
 
MTGs: Millennium Terrorist Goals 
√ War in Afghanistan (for the U.S. alone, approximately $209 billion to date) 
√ War in Afghanistan (going forward? But US, German, French troop buildup)  
√ War in Iraq (possibly $trillions to date)  
 
MCGs: Millennium Climate Goals 
√ Copenhagen Commitments ($75 to $150 billion a year?)   
 
MSGs: Millennium Stimulus Goals 
√ U.S. Stimulus ($787 billion +)  
 
MUGs: Millennium Unwinding Goals  
 
Private sector 
√ $600 trillion in derivative contracts in 2008 up from 100 trillion in 2000 
Public sector 
√ $12 trillion in bonds which OECD countries must issue in 2008, up  
from $9 trillion in 2000 
√ 13% of GDP, Russia’s loan guarantees to state companies  
√ 10% of GDP, Turkey’s loan guarantees to state companies 
√ 53% of GDP, UAE’s loan guarantees to state companies 
 
Sources for Box 4.
67 
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67 U.S. public debt in 2008 was 41% of GDP and will double in the next decade (The Economist, 
November 21, 2009, p. 13). While the sums are staggering, the global implication is dire—‘in a 
few years, the AAA rating of Treasury bonds, the world’s most important security, could be in 
jeopardy (Ibid.).’ Interest on the US debt will triple by 2019 from the current 5% of spending, the 
Millennium Entitlement Goals (MEGs) of the United States Government are estimated to increase 
from 10% of GDP in 2011 to 18% by 2050 (Ibid., p. 27).  It is hard to get a firm figure on the 
Millennium Terrorist Goals (MTGs), but the US military down payment on Afghanistan alone 
has been $209 billion since 2001. In terms of the Millennium Climate Goals (MCGs), the European 
Union has proposed in advance of the December 2009 Copenhagen climate summit that 
developed countries should commit between 22 and 50 billion Euros a year (Financial Times, 
November 3, 2009, p. 9).  On the Millennium Stimulus Goals (MSGs), see ‘Stimulus Sustains 
30,000 Jobs,’ Financial Times, October 16, 2009. But the largest and most immediate expenditure 
facing several OECD countries are the Millennium Unwinding Goals (MUGs)--recapitalizing 
their financial infrastructure. The MUGs have exceeded several trillion dollars in outlays and 
contingent liabilities, and there is little certainty as to the final price tag.  	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goal is not addressed, there will be no playing field, level or not, for developed or  
developing country alike.  The central and confounding issue of our age—what is a 
sustainable deficit—is the core issue of public financial management. The IMF projects 
that ‘ten years of cuts and tax rises lie ahead for developed countries’—hardly 
encouraging for the expansion of foreign aid to developing countries.
68 Given that only a 
handful of developed countries have ever met the seven-tenths of one percent GDP 
contribution target for the MDGs under favorable global economic conditions, it is 
unlikely that the aggregate target will be met going forward with the current conditions 
and new priorities.
69 That the MDGs are not fiscally sustainable should not surprise us—
it is the broader picture of global finance. Until the global economy recovers, resources 
devoted to foreign aid are unlikely to recover, but more important, remittances, direct 
investment, and trade with poor countries, will not recover. 
 
IX. The MDG Investment Decision 
Having addressed the financing decision, we now examine the MDGs as an 
investment decision. The MDGs are the triumph of the short term over the long term.
70 
The fiscal gap in Africa is the worst in the world which makes crafting a development 
strategy rough, very ‘rough justice.’ Africa needs growth promoting investments that 
create real and sustainable jobs more than it needs social services. The first right of 
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68 The G20 nations’ debt has reached 118% of GDP and the IMF estimates that it would take 
spending cuts and tax increases equivalent to 8% of GDP over a decade across the industrialized 
G20 to bring the debt to GDP ratio back down to 60%. See Financial Times, November 4, 2009, p. 3. 
69 While estimates vary on the cost of the MDGs, one estimate is that aid flows of $80 billion to 
$140 billion are required. For a review of the costing studies see Michael Clemens, Charles J. 
Kenny, and Todd Moss, ‘The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and 
Development Success,’ Working Paper 40 (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 
September 2004). 
  
70 Commission on Growth and Development, ‘The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained 
Growth and Inclusive Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2008), p. 35 cited in Penrose, 
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children should be something to eat and then employment which sustains that right.
71 
Getting agriculture moving through infrastructure and input purchasing power through 
wage employment should be priority over social services (especially unsustainable ones 
with universal coverage that compromises quality-- primary education which has 
unproven growth multipliers). The public investment decision facing Africa is a cruel 
choice between a better future or a stagnant present. The meaner resources created by 
global economic crisis makes the choice crueler. A generation of the continent’s children 
may simply not leave the burning house. 
From 1970 to 1993 African public expenditure shows positive growth in services 
and negative growth in agriculture, mining and manufacturing.
72 Countries with high 
sustained growth rates invest 25% of their GDPs with 5-7% of GDP going into 
infrastructure while many developing countries invest 2% or less.
73 Again, Erik Reinert 
succinctly states the development problem: 
[I] shall argue that this palliative economics [the MDGs] has, to a considerable  
extent, taken the place of development economics. Indeed, the balance  
between development economics (i.e. radically changing the productive  
structures of poor countries) and palliative economics (i.e. easing the pains  
of economic misery) is key to avoiding long-term negative effects. It is important  
to note that this change for the worse has happened while, at the same time,  
responsibility for world development has been shifted from the UN 
organizations to the Washington institutions.
74 
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71 Josette Sheeran, executive director of the United Nations World Food Program argues ‘that 
every child deserves a least one humble cup of food a day.’ 1.02 billion people, one-sixth of the 
world’s population, go hungry and a child dies of hunger every six seconds. The Daily Monitor,  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 19, 2009, p. 3. Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child states that every child has the right to life. 
72  Codrina Rada and Lance Taylor, ‘Developing and Transition Economies in the Late Twentieth 
Century: Diverging Growth Rates, Economic Structures and Sources of Demand,’ DESA Working 
Paper 34, UNDP, September 2006, cited in Penrose, pg. 47. 
73 Commission on Growth and Development (2008), p. 35. 
74 Reinert, 240. 	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The MDGs are easy goals. They do not require political elites to make the hard choices 
and painful adjustments necessary for growth. They allow regimes to tread water.  
 
X.  The MDG Investment Decision: Picking Winners and Losers 
 
A long debate in the development field is whether governments and foreign aid 
agencies should target resources and pick winners and thus losers (the investment 
decision). Ironically, while competitiveness is proposed for market-based development, 
the MDGs erode competitiveness, if not impose a monopoly, on public resource 
allocation, domestic and foreign. A core assumption of the MDGs is that the ‘pro-poor’ 
investments it has identified are the winners. The MDGs are rigid and reinforce the 
existing stove piping of service delivery and fail to build synergies. It does not promote, 
much less fund, a ‘whole of government’ approach to service delivery. Improvement of 
public health may well be best achieved by investing in access to water rather than in the 
health sector. Provision of a reliable source of water has ripple effects across many 
sectors in part because it supports the principal caregivers, agriculturalists, nutritionists 
and educators—rural women. While water is one of the stated MDGs, our point is that it 
should not be eclipsed by a focus on achieving other MDG goals (e.g. universal primary 
education). Nearly half the tube wells in the southern region of Ethiopia need 
rehabilitation.  Would tube wells not be a better investment in that region than 
expanding primary education? The dilemma of development is that the tradeoffs are 
stark. In this case, education versus water—they can’t do everything.  
The MDGs are not the best investment decision in terms of pro-poor growth 
multipliers. Investment in education, for example does not have a clear impact on 	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growth whereas, there is considerable evidence that tertiary roads have significant 
growth multipliers and pro-poor outcomes.
75 
Education is the most expensive MDG and is hallowed ground in discussions on 
the rights of the child. It illustrates one of the cruelest choices in development—the 
hopes of the current generation, or the future of their children—intergenerational equity. 
In the recent ACPF conference in Addis Ababa on the financial issues for promoting 
children’s rights in Africa, I emphasized that education is on shaky grounds in terms of 
its impact on growth and fiscal sustainability. I argued that if you want to educate the 
kids, you have to tax the people—particularly those that can pay and do not do so 
currently. I do not believe the message was accepted or considered by the advocates in 
the room.
76  For advocates of the rights of the child, education is a sacred cow. The case 
for education, especially universal primary education must, but hasn’t been made.
77 If 
one accepts the literature that investment in education has little or not impact on 
growth, one has to question the appropriateness of the universal primary education 
MDG. There is a voluminous literature on the subject but I defer to the conclusions of a 
specialist who has worked on the topic for over thirty years. 
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75 Some studies have found that investments in human capital are significant but negative. See, 
George Psacharopoulos and Harry Anthony Patrinos, ‘Returns to Investment in Education: A 
Further Update,’ Policy Research Working Paper No. 2881 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 
September 2002), p. 1. On the pro-poor effect of rural roads, see Shahidur Khandker, Zaid Bakht, 
Gayatri Koolwal, ‘The Poverty Impact of Rural Roads: Evidence from Bangladesh,’ Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3875 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, April 2006).  
76 See Urban Jonsson, ‘The Economic Significance of Investing in Children,’ paper presented to 
the African Child Policy Forum, December 1-2, 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p. 44.  See also his 
Human Rights Approach to Development Programming, (Nairobi: UNICEF, 2003), pp. 1-14. 
77 A recent paper which child rights advocates cite that counters the view that education does not 
promote growth is Edward Anderson and Sarah Hague’s, ‘The Impact of Investing in Children: 
Assessing the Cross-Country Econometric Evidence,’ Working Paper 280 (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, June 2007). Their study found ‘that an increase of 20 percentage points in 
the primary enrolment rate would raise growth by 0.3 percentage points per year, while an 
equivalent increase in secondary enrolment would raise growth by 0.2 percent per year,’ section 
4.4. The authors do caution that simply increasing enrolments does not generate growth.  	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Although the subject is complex, I think there is sufficient reason to  
suggest that conditions requiring expansion of education enrolments 
are not appropriate for budget support operations, without careful  
analysis. This statement may seem shocking, and it certainly does not 
imply that education should not be a focus. The questions are much 
more about education policy in the presence of fiscal constraints,  
accepting that foreign aid does not fill the fiscal gap; and about the 
balance between mass education, in particular its quality, and good  
quality higher and technical education. In other words, the MDGs  
in the case of education not only cause fiscal problems, but may also 
distort sectoral priorities.
78 
 
 
The MDG winners are also narrow.  The exclusive focus on primary education 
leaves out secondary and tertiary education and there is evidence that there are growth 
multipliers from education beyond the primary level.
79 The macro-economic model of 
the Kenyan economy developed by the CIDA funded Long-Range Project in the Kenyan 
Ministry of Finance and Planning, found that there were growth multipliers from 
secondary education. Even if one assumes that the MDGs sectors are winners (e.g. 
primary education), success is often viewed in quantitative rather than qualitative terms 
though the two can be related.
80 One must be careful what one wishes for. Many African 
countries cannot afford universal primary education and the attempt to achieve this 
goal, even with the generosity of strangers, is likely to distort and degrade the quality of 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
78 Perran Penrose, pp. 42-43.  
79 While the returns to education, especially primary, may not have a direct impact on growth, the 
employment effects of education do contribute to growth. Under the Harvard DSA project in 
Ethiopia, an assessment of the economic potential of the southern region found that regional 
growth came only from public sector employment and teachers were by far the most numerous 
employees. See Decentralization Support Activity Project, ‘Regional Economic Policy Review—
Policy for Growth and Competitiveness in the Southern Region—Background Paper for the 1998 
budget planning cycle,’ Project Report No. P-64, December 2004. The importance of ramping up 
public sector employment ahead of an election, especially teachers in the rural areas, has a 
significant political effect with knock on effects to stability and possibly growth.  
80 It is the kind of education rather than the quantity that is important, but the MDGs focus on 
only primary education and its quantity. Ron Dore, ‘The Importance of Education Traditions: 
Japan and Elsewhere, in D.H. Whittaker, ed., Social Evolution, Economic Development and Culture: 
What it Means to Take Japan Seriously (Edward Elgar, 2001) cited in Penrose, p. 43.  The EC’s 
Growth Commission’s report also states that using quantitative indicators of enrollments and 
facilities is a ‘bad idea’, p. 69, cited in Penrose, p. 43. 	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the education system. Meeting MDG goals with irresponsible pupil teacher ratios is not 
development.
81 
 
XI.  The MDG Investment Decision: What Happened to the MAGs 
(Millennium Agriculture Goals)? 
 
One billion people go to bed hungry yet there is not an MDG goal for agriculture.  
By 2050 there will be 3 billion more people to feed. Agriculture has long been neglected. 
A straw poll of a recent conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization found that 
85% of attendees predicted future spikes in food prices and one-third believed the world 
could not feed itself by 2050.
82 The era of cheap food is over and food riots have occurred 
in sixty-three countries over the past year. Agriculture provides the livelihood for 
seventy-five percent of the poor and is the engine of sustainable growth for poor 
countries. Between 1980 and 2006 foreign aid to agriculture declined by three-quarters; 
in 2005 developing countries invested approximately 5% of public revenues in farming; 
and while in the 1960s Green Revolution staple-crop yields were rising by 3-6% per year, 
they are now 1-2% and in poor countries yields are flat.
83 Ominously, it is predicted that 
yields in agriculture globally will decline by 50% over the next decade.
84 The omission of 
agriculture, and thus food security, further illustrates the weakness of the MDGs as a 
development strategy and/or performance system.  
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81Tanzania is considered by some as an MDG success story. Net enrollment has dramatically 
increased but this has lead to much higher pupil-teacher ratios (54-1 for primary and 37-1 for 
secondary).  The MDG benchmarks are quantitative not qualitative and the increase in the p/t 
ratios is reducing quality. See Ruth Carlitz, ‘The Education MDG: Is More Better?’ The Open 
Budget Blog, October 8, 2009. The Harvard DSA project in Ethiopia found pupil-teacher ratios on 
average, exceeding 70. 
82 ‘Investors in rush to feed the world,’ Financial Times, Special Report: Commodities, November 
25, 2009, p. 5.  
83 ‘How to Feed the World,’ The Economist, November 21, 2009, p. 14. 
84 Josette Sheeran (2009). 	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It would require another paper to leach out the roots of why agriculture has been 
neglected from the development agenda for more than two decades. A few observations. 
The rural poor lack voice while the urban dwellers have voice beyond their numbers. 
The MDGs offer short-term welfare to those who can access it best and have the most 
significant political impact. Developing rain-fed subsistence agriculture with growing 
population pressure is extremely difficult and significantly different, and much harder, 
than developing irrigated agriculture.
85 Sequencing the development of rain-fed 
subsistence agriculture goes against many of the tenets held by foreign aid—subsidies of 
inputs (seeds, fertilizer, credit--even if only for the short and medium term) and price 
supports.
86 The complexity, risk, and long time scales needed to have an impact on 
subsistence agriculture are daunting challenges and are a less attractive investment to 
recipient governments and donor/lenders when compared with other low hanging fruit 
which have rapid and visible benefits, especially political.  
Julius Nyrere summarized the difficulty of promoting development in rural 
Africa: ‘While the United States was reaching the moon, we were trying to reach our 
villages and we had the harder task.’ 
Finally, food aid provides Western government’s a win-win resource 
allocation—an outlet to dispose surpluses from their farm support in lieu of additional 
aid outlays that promotes regime support. Recipient governments also have a win-win 
for it provides them discretionary resources to reward support and punish opposition 
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85 Arturo Israel, Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1987). 
86 Charles Mann, ‘Malawi’s Starter Pack: A Smarter Subsidy to Empower the Poor with Science-
Based Agriculture,’ Africa Policy Journal, August 2008. See also, Robert Chambers, Rural 
Development: Putting the First Last (Harlow: Pearson Education, 1983). 	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and it delays the hard choices needed to get agriculture moving with its attendant risks 
of political mobilization and opposition.
87 Food aid can keep failed regimes in power.   
 
XII.  The MDG Investment Decision: What Happened to the MRGs 
(Millennium Revenue Goals)? 
 
There were none. MDGs are about foreign aid, not domestic resource 
mobilization. Taxes are the price of living in a civilized society—a society that wants 
social services. Building a growing and sustainable tax base is essential for expanding 
the social services of a country and probably has the highest return of any investment—
public or private. Domestic revenue mobilization is the heart of development, 
endogenous based growth. The MDGs do not address this issue.  
Much is said about development being a partnership. The resource rappers (rock 
stars and their academic showmen) ignore the resource partnership—again—not 
understanding that short run palliatives can well lead to long term fiscal stress and 
failed expectations. Beyond promoting fiscal sustainability, domestic revenue is the 
other side of the ‘development partner’ equation. 
Domestic revenue determines the level of resources (domestic and foreign) 
available for sustainable capital and recurrent expenditure. The ‘governor’ of sustainable 
growth in social service provision (the MDGs), is domestic revenue mobilization, not 
foreign aid. Prudent financial management requires that the dominant expenditure of 
these services, recurrent wage and statutory payments, should only be financed out of 
domestic revenue.
88 There are proven multiples to investment in revenue mobilization 
especially tax administration. A rule of thumb by tax experts is that the return to 
investment in tax audit is a multiple that ranges from seven to nine. While social cost 
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87 See ‘Aid Groups to Probe Charges by Opposition: Aid Workers Say Government Controls 
System and Opposition Says Food is Used as a Political Weapon,’ The Daily Monitor,  Addis 
Ababa, December 22, 2009, p. 1.  
88 This should exclude non-tax asset sales. 	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benefit analysis is difficult at best, there is no MDG investment that can even come close 
to a multiple of the return to investing in a country's revenue system. Further, there is no 
MDG that comes close to the investment in revenue capacity that promotes 
sustainability of development. In even in the poorest areas of Ethiopia, studies show that 
the limited capacity of revenue administration was not effectively managed and with 
simple redeployment of existing staffs, yields could be significantly increased.
89 
Many tax experts agree that tax administration is tax policy.
90 This finding means 
that one does not have to entertain a ‘big bang’ approach to reforming a country’s 
revenue policy and in turn its revenue administration.
91 Improvement of revenue 
systems need not, and should not, be viewed as a distant up-stream process that takes 
years to provide resources to vulnerable groups. As with the reform of public 
expenditure systems, marginal changes in existing tax systems can have rapid and 
significant effects.
92 
Another reason poor countries need to ramp up domestic revenue mobilization, 
especially non-tariff revenues, is the potential losses of revenue from the NAMA 
liberalization of the WTO Doha Round. These negotiations assume that tariff losses for 
developing countries can be replaced by consumption taxes.
93 
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89 James Warner, ‘Estimating the Current Revenue Potential for the SNNPR,’ Decentralization 
Support Activity Project Report M-56, July 2005.  
90 Milka, Casanegra de Jantscher, ‘Administering the VAT,’ in Malcolm Gillis, Carl S. Shoup, and 
Gerardo P. Sicat eds., Value Added Taxation in Developing Countries, (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1990), p. 179. 
91 Faced (and ignored) by a glacial tax reform by the Federal Government assisted by multilateral 
aid institutions, the Addis Ababa municipal finance bureau contracted a local firm to develop a 
simple but effective tax collection information system (name?). It was rapidly developed, 
implemented and the municipality enjoyed a leap in revenues. The DSA PFM reform project 
which I directed, which focused on expenditure not revenue management, was asked by the head 
of the Southern Region Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, to ‘borrow’ the Addis tax 
information system and assist the Bureau in implementing a tax reform. Mindful of scope creep, 
the project had to decline.  
92 Rental income from expatriate development workers is a significant transfer of foreign aid to 
host nationals in poor countries. Is it taxed?  
93 South Centre, ‘Is Development Back in the Doha Round?’ Policy Brief No. 18, November 2009, p. 
4. Another loss to developing countries in NAMA (Non Agricultural Market Access) negotiations 	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Given the belt tightened ‘new normal’ created by the global crisis, would it not 
be equitable, and ethical, to extend the MRGs beyond revenue mobilization in poor 
countries to those who work in the poverty business? 
 
XIII.  Old development goals never die, they just fade away 
 
In Spring 2009, the Secretary General of the UN addressed the Harvard Kennedy 
School. In the question and answer session that followed his remarks, a student enrolled 
in my public financial management class asked him about his view on the fiscal 
sustainability of the MDGs. The Secretary General argued that while there are ‘issues,’ 
with the MDGs, one hundred and fifty plus countries had signed on to them. Is the 
justification for the MDGs simply that they are a least common denominator of what 
countries can agree on?  
By not maximizing the foreign aid that exists, and in most likelihood will 
diminish in the coming years, the MDGs may well accelerate the decline and/or 
diversion of foreign aid.  In this era of diminishing resources, successful advocacy for 
protecting, much less increasing, foreign aid for development of the bottom billion, will 
have to demonstrate relatively rapid (not millennial) effects, local ownership, stingy 
overhead, and steps to sustainability—the pressures most charities face.  
Discussions on foreign aid often elicit extremes of rhetoric from (it does not work 
and should be stopped—Moyo) to (it really hasn’t been tried and should be ramped 
up—Sachs).
94  These debates miss the real issue—that foreign aid resources for 
development, not military assistance, are likely to be reallocated to entitlement (MEGs), 
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is the terms of trade. It is projected that the tariff losses from the Doha Round for poor countries 
would be on the order of $63.4 billion, ‘Is Development Back.’ 
94 Dambisa Moyo, Dead AID: Why AID is Not Working and How there is Another Way for Africa (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2009); Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our 
Time (New York: Penguin, 2005). 	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terrorism (MTGs), climate (MCGs), stimulus (MSGs), and the more immediate, though 
truly millennial, and the more costly, the unwinding goals (MUGs).  
As an unstructured strategy for an increasingly marginalized recipient, the 
MDGs cannot hope to compete for resources of structured strategies of their patrons (the 
MEGs, MTGs, MCGs, MSGs, MUGs). Debating whether the MDGs are symbolic or 
practical while the house burns gets us nowhere.   
Foreign aid to Africa is needed and can work. It can provide foreign exchange 
needed for growth, and food when needed for survival. Foreign aid as finance works. 
Foreign aid as investment is where it often goes off track. The opportunity costs of the 
MDGs as an investment strategy has not been adequately scrutinized as there are clearly 
better investments, which promote growth. Even if the MDGs were reached, they are not 
sustainable and thus not appropriate. 
 
XIV.  A Proposal: Decade Infrastructure Goals (DIGs)   
 
This is a challenging time for rethinking the dominant development strategy.  
Development has to be located within an economic crisis that has not been experienced 
since the 1930s. There is uncertainty, it is different this time, and a different strategy of 
development is needed.  
The MDGs should be replaced with the following strategy: DIGs (Decade 
Infrastructure Goals). DIGs has four components: 
•  DTGs: decade tax goals 
•  DAGs: decade agriculture goals 
•  DRGs: decade road goals 
•  DPGs: decade power goals 
Given the uncertainty of the times, the central feature of a development strategy 
for Africa should be the promotion of certainty and reduction of risk. All decisions 	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involve factual and valuational premises, and uncertainty can be viewed in terms of two 
dimensions: facts and values as illustrated in Figure 1.
95  One could debate endlessly 
about where the MDGs would be located in this matrix. In education for example, there 
is uncertainty on the facts (the impact of primary education on growth) and values 
(whether secondary or vocational education should be part of the mix). The lack of 
consensus on how to manage the global economic crisis means that development 
strategies for Africa are also not located in Quadrant 1. 
We would propose a Decade Infrastructure Goals (DIGs) strategy for Africa, as it 
would be squarely located in the certainty of Quadrant 1. By starting D for decade, DIGs 
avoids the shifting fads that blow through development and will force a discipline of 
direction with a time scale that promotes accountability. With I for infrastructure (roads, 
revenue, power, agriculture) the DIGs focus on investments that are proven to have 
growth multipliers, alleviate poverty and promote sustainability.  
The DIGs, particularly, physical infrastructure, can utilize all sources of finance 
(domestic/foreign; loan/grant) and by being project based, reduce the volatility of 
foreign aid. Unlike expanding social services, foreign aid financed infrastructure can 
improve not impair a country’s competitiveness. The DIGs reduce the risk of 
development as we know how to design, implement, and finance them and their value 
and impact are certain (Quadrant 1). 
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95 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1997), pp. 4-5. 	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                                                Figure 1 
Thompson Tuden Decision Matrix
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  Are the DIGs in essence, the ‘China Model’ of development. China’s emphasis on 
building infrastructure can in many ways be a win-win for African countries and China. 
As is often the case, the problems emerge in how a strategy is implemented. Chinese 
infrastructure projects often do not promote as much local employment that the could 
nor is there sufficient attention to twinning and upskilling local labor. In the 1980’s when 
Chinese foreign aid built the Kasarani sports stadium in Kenya, the anecdote circulated 
that they had brought there own laborers and the rocks and sand.
97  
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Decision,’ James D. Thompson and Arthur Tuden, eds., Comparative Studies in Administration 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), pp. 195-216. 
97 It speaks volumes that the Ministry responsible for foreign aid in China is Commerce. In 2009 
the Vice Minister of Commerce visited Harvard University to discuss how China could better 
engage in development in Africa. I disagreed with my colleagues who advocated that they study 
Western foreign and I argued that their infrastructure strategy was a best bet for the continent 
and for themselves. I did stress the need for improved labor policies in development projects and 
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XV.  Reviving Project Support 
	 ﾠ Budget Support has been the foreign aid flavor of the month for several years. 
Even if one discounts all of the difficulties of this policy instrument listed above, there is 
a consensus in the field of public policy, that policy instruments are weakened when 
they are used for multiple objectives.
98 To diversify the risk of delivery, a portfolio of 
instruments should be used: budget support, project support as well as non-public 
money channels—civil society support. Limited budget support should be continued to  
assist Africa with reserves to manage shocks and smooth out domestic revenue and 
foreign aid flows. Project support should be revived principally to reduce the volatility 
of foreign aid, but also to focus on infrastructure investments. The difficulties and cost of 
budget support have been overly discounted and the virtues of project support 
overlooked. Projects are contractual and commit foreign aid over a multi-year time 
frame—something Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) have largely failed 
to do.  Project support is arguably less intrusive. Budget support has meant that foreign 
aid agencies have to assess and reduce overall fiduciary risk which has often meant the 
introduction of questionable and diffuse long-term PFM reforms. With project support, 
financial risk can be clearly and closely monitored (physical progress, line item reports, 
continuous audit). Finally, projects can keep recipient and funder focused on capital 
investment, notwithstanding the fungibility of money. 
  A final observation about the relative risk to foreign aid agencies of project 
versus budget support. Buget support programs while seeming to have fewer 
transaction costs, are often by their scale, more difficult to slow down and indeed 
terminate. A discrete project can be closed down for mismanagement but it does not 
reflect on a broader political indictment of the government. Slowing or terminating a 
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the development impact of building secondary roads with their concessionary funds that connect 
to the trunk roads they were building on a commercial basis.  
98 Prior to the 2005 elections in Ethiopia, foreign aid agencies were planning to massively ramp 
up assistance and they wanted to diversify instruments.  	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large budget support operation can have sector and multi-sector effects and by their 
scale are political.  
 
XVI. and Copenhagen? 
 
  Others will ponder the effects, meterological, political, developmental of the 
recent discussions in Copenhagen. Perhaps it is the end of the beginning or the 
beginning of the end. Climate change is the best and most ominous sign of the global 
LIE.  Climate is the most comprehensive form of leverage, it is seemingly beyond the 
capacity of national and global institutions to manage, and the experts are divided on 
technical and financial solutions—though progress seems to have been made on a 
scientific consensus. If one were to locate it in the decision matrix presented above, the 
management of climate change is certainly not in Quadrant 1 hopefully, it is not in 
Quadrant 4. 
What does Copenhagen portend for Africa and its children? Will Green Greed 
(the Millennium Climate Goals—MCGs) replace MDGs as the new strategy to shame 
developed countries to transfer more resources? If the MDGs were not financed, why 
should it be assumed that the MCGs earmarked for developing countries will be 
financed? The leader of the African negotiating team at the conference argued that 
Africa needs trillions of dollars but accepts the figure of $10 billion as the start up 
donation for the upcoming three years.
 99 As with the MDGs, the MCGs are silent on the 
topic of domestic revenue goals, which are needed to make the green transfers 
sustainable. As with the MDGs, the immediacy of the MCGs discounts future fiscal 
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99 The leader of the African delegation to the Copenhagen conference on climate, Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia, said that Africa benefitted most from the climate deal, and ‘though Africa’s financial 
need for the climate change compensation would be in trillions, due to the current financial crisis 
the developed nations are not in a position to be bounced,’ The Daily Monitor, Addis Ababa, 
December 22, 2009, p. 1, emphasis added. The President of the African Development Bank argued 
at the conference that Africa needs $40 billion a year for climate aid, The Daily Monitor, Addis 
Ababa, December 9, 2009, p. 1.  	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sustainability--sustainability is viewed as now. Even more than then MDGs, Africa 
views the MCGs as a one-way transfers because climate change has be caused by the 
emissions of the North. Development under the MCGs becomes an entitlement 
relationship, not a partnership. The MCGs may well further polarize North-South and 
South-South differences leading to beggar thy neighbor policies.  
If a green hat transfers more resources than an open palm, so much the better. 
But what resources? Africa does not need high tech, expensive and unproven 
technology. Bleeding edge green technology should be installed by the highly polluting 
countries and indeed there may well be an argument for transferring earlier generation 
technology at deep discount which gets growth going on the continent.
100 As green 
technology is proven and becomes discounted, transfer to Africa will occur. To the 
extent that green technology brings greater dependence on foreign technical assistance 
and dependence on external patrons, but most importantly does not address the most 
critical problem in Africa--employment, the opportunity costs of green development 
must be carefully weighed.
101 Attention to sustainable agriculture, which would include 
agro-forestry, would address some of the serious ecological deterioration that is in the 
hands of African’s to reverse.  
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100 There are striking possiblities combining green technology with low cost implementation.  A 
program in Ethiopia modeled after the Bunker Roy approach to development based on the 
Barefoot College model in India, introduced solar energy into some of the remotest regions of 
Ethiopia using unskilled staff, even widow, which provided extremely low cost implementation. 
See Thomas Chupein, Jamshed Kazi, Marija Kuzmanovic, Beke Ncube and Ghanshyuam Tiwari, 
‘Copouts, Washouts and Dropouts—the First Barefoot Solar Engineers in Africa,’ case study 
presentation in my course, The Management of Development Assistance Projects, Fall 2009, Harvard 
Kennedy School.  
101 An example of a non-green technology driven development strategy has been Ethiopia’s run 
for the roses. The flower farms that have sprouted up with a half-million dollar grant from the 
Netherlands government and generous five-year tax holidays as well as tailored public 
infrastructure are not a best bet. The strategy has anemic employment benefits, diverts enormous 
water resources from subsistence and food crop agriculture, and is a proven polluter. Some 
observers have also noted the ethnic preference in granting land leases, which underscores the 
political dimension of picking economic winners and losers. 	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Africa does face a serious climate problem. Governance. No other factor comes 
close in retarding the continent’s development. Governance is essential to attracting 
investment, expanding trade and prudent fiscal management—three pillars of growth.  
 
XVII.  Summary 
 
As the most vulnerable global citizens, Africa’s children have been the most 
harmed by the global economic crisis.  
  The damage that resulted from utter reliance on the invisible hand  
  of the market is different from that of the more intrusive appendages 
  of the state, but both have given us plenty of reason to distrust  
  final solutions. Eclecticism seems both smarter and saner than any 
  alternative.
102 
 
The global crisis forces Africa to make even crueler choices. What is worse—
broken promises or cruel choices? Public financial management is about making cruel 
choices—executing political will—who gets what, when and where. Development is 
about ‘rough justice’ and at best is ‘making everyone equally unhappy.’
 103 The MDGs 
promote the false hope that an ‘acceptable’ quality of life can be achieved by poorest of 
the planet in a short period of time. This is of course an illusion, and more so today 
given the unfavorable resource climate for increasing transfers to poor countries. Public 
Financial Management is also the management of illusion. There is never enough. A 
development strategy, however, should not be an illusion. Hardheaded and creative 
policies are now needed—not more of the same--or final solutions.  
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102 Susan Neiman, Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 2009), p. 72. 
103 Allan Morris, head of the Australian Grants Commission, summarized his job in setting the 
allocations between sub-national governments as ‘making everyone equally unhappy’—a 
moniker most budget directors can appreciate.  	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The MDGs are perhaps the best example of ‘the big plan’ in development. Big 
plans run the risk of what Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden observed 20 years ago 
that plans in poor countries are designed to ‘satisfy everybody, spread it around, 
postpone the evil day and be vague.’
104 Best to get DIGging.  
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104 Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990). 